



Asia-Pacific Counter-IED Fusion Center

Monthly IED Activity Report



DOI: 31 August 2017

About the APCFC

The Asia-Pacific C-IED Fusion Center is the premier center for irregular warfare analysis in the U.S. Pacific Command. The center develops and synchronizes C-IED and EOD programs and regional engagements. The center resources USARPAC C-IED training to ensure U.S., Allied, and Partner Nations survivability.



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
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
Executive Summary: In August, there was a 13% increase in IED events across the Asia-Pacific region. IED-related casualties also increased by a substantial 92% from July. In South Asia, IED activity increased by 11% and there were 27% more IED-related casualties than last month. In Southeast Asia, IED-related casualties were more than twice as high as last month's even though overall IED events were only slightly higher in August (up 15%). For a second consecutive month, there were no reported IED events in Northeast Asia.

There were **93** IED events in the Asia-Pacific region in August 2017




Icons depict events for August 2017; heat map depicts event density from August 2016 - August 2017


August IED events



August IED events by Country




August IED Casualties



Click on an entry to advance to the associated page.

This document is limited to those personnel performing military, intelligence, law enforcement, or security duties in support of C-IED operations.

August Asia-Pacific IED Events by Region




Executive Summary (Continued)

In South Asia, IED activity increased from 37 events in July to 41 events in August. IED-related casualties also increased, from 33 in July to 41 casualties in August. In Bangladesh, there was an overall drop in IED activity, however, two Neo-Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (Neo-JMB) related events indicate that the group was preparing to conduct attacks (**see pg. 8**). In India, there was a 30% increase in IED events and an 8% increase in IED-related casualties. This rate increase appears to be related to a rise in IED attacks by Gorkha Janmukti Morcha (GJM) members in West Bengal (**see pg. 9**). In Nepal, IED activity remained low for a second straight month; an escalation in politically motivated IED attacks is expected during next month's regional elections (**see pg. 10**).


In Southeast Asia, IED activity increased from 46 events in July to 53 events in August. Despite this marginal increase, IED-related casualty figures were nearly 2.5 times higher this month compared to July. This casualty spike is largely attributable to a 31 AUG event in the Philippines, during which Maute Group militants detonated an IED against security forces. In the Philippines, IED activity remained at slightly elevated levels due to the ongoing Marawi conflict and an escalation in Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) attacks in Mindanao (**see pg. 12**). In Burma, attacks by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) caused IED events to skyrocket, reaching the highest level over the past year (**see pg. 14**). In Indonesia, a 15 AUG IED cache recovery of reported radiological components suggests that Jammah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) militants may be attempting to construct a "dirty bomb" (**see pg. 15**).

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from OPEN SOURCES are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations. Event refers to specific IED activity categories: IED Detonation, IED Found/Cleared, IED Hoax, IED Cache.

PACOM IED Events - Past 12 Months



Past Year IED Event Casualty Count




Icons depict events from August 2016 to August 2017; occasional overlap occurs

South Asia sees the highest level of IED events in the region, primarily due to India's high activity. IED activity across the region is often centered around periods of political unrest or contested elections. Devices thrown or emplaced during those outbreaks of violence vary widely in complexity (e.g. basic, command-wire to radio-controlled) and lethality.


Southeast Asia sees approximately half the activity of South Asia, with the Philippines and Thailand as the primary contributors to the number of events. While Thailand's IED activity is primarily attributable to Muslim-Malay insurgents in the south, the Philippines faces communist, jihadist, and Moro separatist threats. By comparison, attacks in Indonesia and Malaysia are far less frequent.

Northeast Asia sees relatively few IED attacks and they can often be attributed to an individual's act of protest against an employer, the government, or retaliation against an acquaintance. Disaffected groups, such as the Uyghurs in China, occasionally incorporate IEDs in their attacks. Press reporting from the region is limited and generally unreliable, therefore some events may not be reflected.

Past Year IED events




Past Year IED events by Country




IED Activity - Past 12 Months

Switch Type



Group Affiliation



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics are presumed to be approximations. Graphics represent known switch type and group affiliation.

Incident Highlight: Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army IED attacks in Rakhine State

Starting on 25 AUG, approximately 150 ARSA militants conducted multiple complex attacks on thirty Burmese Police Stations and an unidentified Tatmadaw (Burmese Army) Base in Rakhine State. ARSA militants were reportedly armed with small arms, sticks, IEDs and swords during the coordinated attacks. Reports state that IEDs used by ARSA militants incorporate iron pipes, along with ammonium nitrate fertilizer and gunpowder (**see VOI for more information on ARSA**).

ARSA militants emplaced IEDs along roads in Ward 5, Maungtau Township attempting to restrict Burmese security forces' freedom of movement and reaction time. The fighting between ARSA and Burmese security forces is a culmination of troop reconstitution in Rakhine State by the Burmese military in recent weeks, and kicked off on the day that the United Nations released the final report by the Rakhine Advisory Commission.



Seized IED cache containing IEDs, knives, slingshots, and darts


Maungtau residents stated that small arms fire could be heard throughout the night. In response to the fighting, residents evacuated the area towards Bangladesh in an attempt to escape the ongoing armed conflict. Between 25 and 28 AUG, State media reported that around 100 personnel were killed, 88 houses, 100 shops, two mosques, eight religious schools, nine vehicles and four motorcycles were destroyed during the fighting between ARSA militants and Burmese security forces. Rohingya civilians have been fleeing the area en masse, with approximately 80,000 crossing into Bangladesh in a matter of days.

These coordinated attacks are the first IED events conducted by ARSA, previously known as Harakat al-Yaqin (HAY), since the October 2016 attack on police outposts in Maungtau. However, the August 2017 attacks showed much more sophistication and complexity than the 2016 attacks. Increasing ARSA activity adds to an already unstable national security situation for Burma and the South and Southeast Asian regions.

Sources: ABC News (8/26/17) Dawn (8/26/17) GNLM (8/26/17) GNLM (8/27/17) GNLM (8/28/17) GNLM (8/29/17) Frontier Myanmar (8/29/17) UN News Center (8/31/17)

Special Assessment: VBIEDs in the Asia-Pacific

One of the most enduring TTPs used by militants and insurgents is the VBIED. Occurring around the world, the VBIED's versatility and lethality have made it impactful for decades. In the Asia-Pacific, militants have been using VBIEDs since at least 1964, when Viet Cong operatives detonated a car filled with explosives under the Brinks Hotel in Saigon. Asia-Pacific VBIEDs have been used by Islamic militants (like in other conflict areas), but are primarily used by ethno-separatists and political insurgents. On 16 AUG, suspected militants from Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK), an Islamic separatist organization, stole six vehicles in Songkhla province, southern Thailand, after killing the car lot employee. Working quickly, the militants rigged three of the vehicles with explosives, in the fourth such event in the last 16 months (**see Thailand IED Events**).



VBIED concentrations over the last five years

VBIEDs can incorporate any type of motorized vehicle, such as trucks, motorcycles, boats, or cars; they can be either suicide devices (in which the driver often attempts to get the vehicle as close as possible to the intended target) or non-suicide devices (in which the vehicle is left near the target). Likewise, in the Asia-Pacific, switches tend to be either timed or RC. Vehicles have been used continually because they have several advantages over other platforms; they allow for the concealment of the payload and rarely rouse suspicion, they are easy to maneuver and emplace, and can increase the destructive power of a detonation.

In South Asia, VBIEDs were pioneered by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), starting with the 1987 truck-borne suicide attack against a Sri Lankan Army post that killed and wounded several dozen individuals. LTTE used VBIEDs prolifically until their defeat in 2009, and the majority were suicide attacks. Many of these attacks went on to inspire attacks by Islamist groups in the Middle East; the USS Cole bombing in 2000 bore striking similarities to the LTTE attack on the Sri Lankan Navy vessel Abheetha in 1991. LTTE created an elite maritime unit, the Sea Tigers, to conduct attacks against the Sri Lankan Navy; like many other LTTE units, they included suicide squads that would often use small watercraft to conduct attacks.

While LTTE was prolific in VBIED use, that trend has not continued in South Asia since their defeat in 2009. India, where the majority of VBIED attacks occurred over the last five years, only experienced 10 total events. The majority of these events were attacks on individuals for personal vendetta, however some security forces and political rallies have been targeted as well. While many interesting TTPs have more frequently been seen in India, such as arrow tip IEDs or daisy chains, VBIEDs are rare.

In contrast, Southeast Asian Islamic extremist groups and ethno-separatists have used VBIEDs extensively to attack tourist spots and other soft targets. One of the most high profile of these events was the J.W. Marriot hotel bombing in Jakarta on 5 AUG 2003. Al-Qa'ida backed Jemaah Islamiya (JI) militants detonated a car bomb targeting foreign tourists, killing 10 civilians and wounding at least 140 others.

Thailand, however, remains the leader in terms of number of VBIED events and lethality. Over the past five years there have been 110 VBIED events in Thailand perpetrated almost exclusively by ethno-separatists in the south. Motorcycle VBIEDs are common in Thailand, but there have also been several attacks using cars or trucks. One such attack was the pick-up truck-borne attack at a shopping mall on Samui Island, a well-known tourist destination, in April 2015. Developments, like increased speed of assembly seen on 16 AUG (dropped to about 3 hours from four months), show that the VBIED TTP is constantly evolving to match the needs of militant organizations.

In North Asia, VBIEDs are very rare, with only one event since 2012. This event involved a suicide attack on the Communist Party office in Karakax, Xinjiang, killing one civilian and wounding three others. More common in North Asia has been the deployment of IEDs on trains, such as the July 2016 train bombing in Taipei, Taiwan, and the use of sarin gas on the Tokyo subway in 1995. While some of these events have undoubtedly been acts by terrorist organizations, most follow the norm of disgruntled individuals expressing grievances.

Overall, VBIEDs remain a key TTP in the Asia-Pacific, having caused approximately 530 casualties over since 2012; the vast majority of these casualties have been civilians. As far as known switch types, the majority are triggered by RC technology, with timed switches being second most common. Compared to other regions, the number of suicide VBIEDs is much lower in the Asia-Pacific, likely due to the type of militant organizations using the VBIEDs; for example, as opposed to radical Islamic groups in the Middle East, the ideologies currently driving the main perpetrators of VBIED activity in the Asia-Pacific are not jihadist in nature. However, this may change if jihadist groups aligned with ISIS or al-Qa'ida in the Asia-Pacific, such as Maute Group in the Philippines or Neo-JMB in Bangladesh, begin using suicide VBIEDs more frequently again. An increase in frequency of VBIEDs could be an indicator of returnee foreign fighters to the Asia-Pacific from Middle Eastern conflicts.

Sources: OPCW (6/1/01) CBS (5/8/03) CIMSEC (6/30/12) NYT (7/8/16) Hindustan Times (12/28/16) Reuters (8/16/17) Garda (8/17/17) Bangkok Post (8/17/17) CPost Database

Person of Interest / VEO of Interest

POI: Wan Mohd Aquil Bin Wan Zainal Abidin

ALIAS: Akel Zainal; Akil Zainal **FROM:** Malaysia **DOB:** 13 Jun 1979 (38)
AREAS OF OPERATION: Malaysia and Syria **AFFILIATION:** ISIS

Wan Mohd Aquil Bin Wan Zainal Abidin has been an ISIS recruiter since 2014. Before fighting with ISIS in Syria, Zainal was a drummer in the Malaysian pop group, the "UKays." During his previous life as a musician Zainal had amassed approximately 15,000 Facebook followers, which he actively uses to recruit Malaysians for operations in Malaysia and to fight alongside ISIS in Syria-Iraq.

Zainal is likely on the short list to replace former leader of ISIS external operations in Malaysia, Muhammad Mohamed Jedi Wannndy; Wannndy was killed in Raqqa, Syria on 29 APR. If chosen, it is unclear whether Zainal will assume all of Wannndy's roles and responsibilities. Wannndy was highly resourceful, skillfully using social media to plan and coordinate attempts to attack Malaysian targets (17 thwarted and one successful); by actively recruiting new members; overseeing financial sourcing, and arranging for would-be militants to travel to Syria.

With upwards of 1000 Southeast Asian's fighting with ISIS in Iraq and Syria, there is a valid concern that these fighters will return to their Southeast Asia home nations to conduct operations. Supporters of ISIS have identified several countries to be part of a proposed ISIS East Asia wilayah (or territory). These countries include Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Burma, and Japan. Although speculative, returning ISIS fighters (from Syria and Iraq) could join existing extremist groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah (in Indonesia) or the Abu Sayyaf Group (in the Philippines) and provide a more extreme militant ideology, to include much needed operational and IED skill-sets. All of which is further reinforced by battleground experience and access to international extremist networks. Alternatively, returning fighters could form the core of a new set of regional groups, bringing new skills, expertise, motivations, ideologies, and networks into the region. Should Zainal replace Wannndy, he will be the new face for Malaysian IS supporters throughout Southeast Asia and the Middle East.

Sources: NBA (10/14/14) BBC News (4/6/16) Star Online (5/11/17) FMT (5/11/17) FMT (6/22/17) ASEAN Economist (6/23/17) NST (7/20/17) NST (8/22/17)



VEO: Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA)

AREA OF OPERATIONS: northern Rakhine State, Burma **TTPs:** Small arms, IEDs, crude weapons **ALIAS:** Harakah al-Yaqin (HaY)

ARSA was formed in 2013, reportedly by a committee of about 20 senior leaders headquartered in Mecca, all with Rohingya heritage. The group is led in Burma by Attullah Abu Ammar Jununi, who was born in Pakistan of Rohingya parents and raised in Saudi Arabia.

ARSA launched their first major attack on 9 OCT 16. Hundreds of ARSA members staged a complex attack on three Border Guard Posts. The group emplaced an IED on an approach road and felled trees along other approach roads to hinder responding forces. More recently, on 25 AUG 17, ARSA staged a larger wave of coordinated attacks on 24-30 police outposts throughout Rakhine state, covering a range of almost 100km (**see Incident Highlight**). Estimates of the number of fighters involved ranges from hundreds to thousands. The Burmese government formally outlawed ARSA as a terrorist organization on 27 AUG and refers to the group as "Bengali terrorists."

ARSA's stated demands include: reinstate indigenous native ethnic status of Rohingyas, issue citizenship, allow international humanitarian relief work to resume, initiate and expedite UN-led international independent investigation in Rakhine state, and hold perpetrators of violence accountable for crimes. They believe they have legitimacy under international law, repeatedly emphasize that they have no ties to any terrorist groups across the world, and do not believe they are "jihadists" or terrorists, a claim firmly denied by the Burmese Government.

Sources: ICG (12/15/16) rohingya-salvation.html (3/29/17) Asia Times (8/28/17) Radio Free Asia (9/1/17) The Guardian (9/2/17) Channel News Asia (9/7/17)



South Asia: August Significant Activity

South Asia Floods

Since July, the death toll of regional flooding has killed over 1,000 civilians, and a further 40 million people have been affected (to include losing housing, livelihood, livestock, or property). The United Nations has established 2,000 camps to provide aid to displaced persons. The areas worst hit by the floods include India's Assam, Bihar, and Uttar Pradesh States, Nepal's Terai region, and Bangladesh's Kurigram and Chimari districts. Damage from the floods will likely create food shortages and instability in the areas most badly affected, in addition to health risks from decomposing material and standing water. **NYT (8/29/17) NPR (8/29/17) Guardian (8/30/17)**

Bangladesh

On 10 AUG, Indian authorities arrested a Bangladeshi militant in Delhi, as he tried to escape to Nepal. The militant, Raza ul Ahmed, reportedly a member of Ansar al-Islam (formerly Ansar Bangla Team, ABT), was involved in a fake currency operation in West Bengal. An additional ABT suspect, Abdullah-al-Mamon, was also arrested in Uttar Pradesh the week prior; from him, authorities recovered a bomb-making manual, jihadi literature in Bengali, and fake ID cards and documents used to help Bangladeshi militants re-settle in India.

Hindu (8/6/17) NDTV (8/10/17)

India

On 14 AUG, 86 militants from various groups in Manipur surrendered at a Homecoming Ceremony held on the 1st BN Manipur Rifles parade ground, and attended by Manipur chief minister N Biren Singh. Singh promised his administration will protect and assist militants who choose to "join the mainstream" and stated that a newly-framed state policy had been sent to the Indian central government for approval, which he hoped would help reduce violence. The surrendering militants included 23 from Kangleipak Communist Party, 17 United National Liberation Front, 10 People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak, eight People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (Pro), and four Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup personnel. Their surrendered items included at least one AK-47 rifle, at least one M16 rifle, lethod bombs (underbarrel grenade launcher or barrel-launched grenades), and pistols. The ceremony is held annually, but the number of surrenders is usually a good indicator of either security forces effectiveness, or the progress of negotiations with the state. **Hindustan Times (8/14/17)**

On 23 AUG, press reported on the alleged death of Shafi Armar, an Indian ISIS fighter who was associated with most ISIS-affiliated plots that have occurred in India over the last 18 months. According to an ISIS release, Shafi Armar died carrying out a suicide attack in Raqqa, Syria. Armar's death comes two months after his identification as a specially designated global terrorist. Armar has been reported as dead several times before, and it is unclear why ISIS would give up such an effective recruiter given its aspirations in India and Jammu and Kashmir, so it remains to be seen whether Shafi Armar is actually dead. **Deccan Herald (8/23/17)**


On 28 AUG, press reported on a charge sheet brought by Indian law enforcement against a pair of ISIS-affiliated militants who were captured from Gujarat in February. The charge sheet referenced transcripts from Vaseem (online alias "Ninja Fox") that indicated their intention to conduct lone-wolf style attacks similar to those that had become commonplace in Europe based on guidance from their handlers. This information provides some insight to the kinds of attacks ISIS wants to conduct in India. **One India (8/28/17)**

On 30 AUG, press reported on the Pro-Talk United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) faction's request that indigenous people unite against attacks by "non-Assamese." The request follows an incident where a group of ex-ULFA militants were attacked inside a business owned by two Bengali persons in Nagaon, which caused widespread protests. Amidst the high tension, an IED and small arms cache was recovered from Nagaon district, which police suspect was intended for use against non-Assamese people, indicating the potential for IED violence related to the pro-talk ULFA agitation. **Indian Express (8/30/17) The Tribune (8/30/17)**

Sri Lanka

Starting on 8 AUG, Interpol and Sri Lanka Police hosted a three-day regional counter-terrorism conference in Colombo. Participants included both South and Southeast Asian countries, such as India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Nepal, Indonesia, and the Philippines. The goal of the conference was to develop regional cooperation to counter criminal and terror activities through experience exchange. **Colombo Page (8/8/17)**

Bangladesh: August IED Events




There was one IED detonation event and two IED cache events.

On 13 AUG, an IED cache was recovered from two Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS) activists at Saddam Hossain Islamic University in Kushtia, Khulna; two students detained. The cache contained five petrol bombs, 11 crude bombs, bomb-making materials, electronic equipment, CDs, and bladed weapons. **Daily Star (8/15/17)**


On 15 AUG, two IEDs detonated during 'Operation August Bite' at the Olio Hotel in Panthpath, Dhaka. The first IED detonation was designed to blow off the door of the hotel room, and the second detonation was a PBIED that killed one suspected Neo-JMB member. Following the detonations, a cache was recovered; the cache contained an unknown number of IEDs. An unknown number of attackers were allegedly planning to detonate IEDs at the mourner processions at Bangabandhu Memorial Museum. **Indian Express (8/15/17) Dhaka Tribune (8/16/17) BDNews24 (8/17/17)**

On 27 AUG, an IED prematurely detonated at a suspected militant hideout in Kashar, Habirbari, Bhaluka, Mymensingh; one suspected Neo-JMB member killed and one child wounded. Following the detonation, security forces recovered a cache containing two pressure cooker IEDs (2.5kg each), one hand bomb, one homemade grenade, three tracer rockets, and 8kg gunpowder. **Daily Star (8/28/17) BDNews24 (8/28/17)**

Past Year IED Events by Type



Past Year IED Event Casualty Count




IED activity was lower in August, despite the execution of 'Operation August Bite.' The trend of defensive PBIEDs continued during this operation, as the suicide bomber killed himself before he could be captured by authorities. This is 13th PBIED detonation event in 2017, most of which have been defensive detonations.

Bangladeshi authorities continued to dismantle Neo-JMB and other organizations during the month of August. It has long been known that ICS is a feeder organization for Jemaat-e-Islami (Jel), and now more recently for Neo-JMB. High-profile militants, such as Marjan and Aslam Hossain (alias Rashedul Islam, Rash), were ICS activists and then became leaders and planners of Jel and/or Neo-JMB. It is likely that Bangladeshi authorities will continue the fight against militant groups in the upcoming months.

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

India: August IED Events



There were 18 IED detonation events, six IED found and cleared events, nine IED cache events and two hoax IED events.

On 10 AUG, a hoax IED was found on the Akal Takht Express train near Amethi, Uttar Pradesh. The device incorporated a metal container and had a main charge composed of firecracker powder, but was missing a timer or other sort of initiator; police speculated it was intended to grab attention. A note was found attached which claimed to be from Indian Mujahideen (IM), and threatened revenge for the "murder of Dujana," a senior Lashkar-e Tayyiba militant. **Indian Express (8/10/17) FirstPost (8/10/17)**


Between 12-14 AUG, three IEDs detonated and one cache was recovered by security forces around Imphal and Moreh, Manipur; three suspects were detained. The events were associated with violence that is typical of the region leading up to Indian Independence Day celebrations on 15 AUG. **ePao (8/12/17) (8/13/17) India.com (8/13/17) Assam Tribune (8/14/17)**

On 15 AUG, an IED detonated against a Special Task Force (STF) patrol in Padiya, Sukma, Chhattisgarh, resulting in three STF personnel wounded. The device was reportedly a victim-operated "pipe bomb", which detonated when one of the troopers accidentally stepped on it. **New Indian Express (8/15/17) Hindustan Times (8/15/17)**


On 19 AUG, an IED detonated at around midnight near Old Supermarket in Darjeeling, West Bengal, resulting in damage to approximately 20 buildings. The IED was reportedly remote controlled, but no other information was available regarding the device. **New Indian Express (8/19/17) Times of India (8/20/17) Asian Age (8/20/17)**

On 25 AUG, an IED detonated against a civilian truck transporting food along National Highway 10 near Kalimpong, Darjeeling, West Bengal. The incident occurred after a group of armed men shot the truck's tires to bring it to a stop and stole the food. Afterwards, the men placed an IED under the vehicle and detonated it, suggesting the IED was command detonated; no other information available regarding the device. The attack appeared related to an ongoing strike. **One India (8/26/17)**

Past Year IED Events by Type



Past Year IED Event Casualty Count



Overall IED activity slightly increased in August. Maoist activity remained low due to ongoing monsoon season flooding, though this decline was offset by typical Independence Day violence, a sudden burst of IED activity in Darjeeling, where Gorkha activists are currently agitating for a new state.


The Darjeeling attacks are related to an ongoing bandh (strike) agitating for the creation of a new Gorkhaland state for ethnic Nepalis living in Northern West Bengal. The agitation began because the Mamata Banerjee-led government dictated that schools from class I to IX would be taught in Bengali language. The motivation for Gorkhaland is that Indian states carry enormous power, allowing for substantial self-determination. Separation of states also has precedent, with Telangana splitting from Andhra Pradesh in 2014 to improve governance of the Telugu-speaking region. IED violence in Darjeeling will likely continue in the short-term.

There are no indications IM has returned and the hoax may be a "lone wolf," but IM leadership remains in Pakistan and could still regenerate.


IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Return to first page

Nepal: August IED Events



Past Year IED Events by Type



There was one IED detonation event and one IED cache event.

On 5 AUG, a pressure cooker IED detonated along a road in Surunga, Saptari, Mechi; four police officers in a truck were wounded. **Himalayan Times (8/6/17)**

On 28 AUG, an IED cache was recovered from two Indian citizens by local police in Bara, Narayani, Central Development Region. The cache contained explosives allegedly being smuggled for an upcoming festival. **Nepal Monitor (8/28/17)**

IED activity remained low in August; the lull in activity in July and August is directly related to a lack of pre-election activity. However, the next election is set for 18 SEP. It is expected that there will be another spike in IED activity. Despite the overall lack of activity, the detonation of a roadside pressure cooker IED against security forces in Saptari wounded four officers. The detonation occurred in an area that has been targeted in the past; this area will also be involved in the upcoming September elections.

Southeast Asia: August Significant Activity

Burma

At the end of August, Rangoon regional police installed 411 CCTVs in 25 adjacent townships. As part of an initiative to reduce crime, police hung the cameras around local bazaars and other civilian areas. Mostly to monitor petty theft and other small crimes, these CCTVs have the possibility to identify when IEDs are used in criminal or retaliatory attacks. Like in many other countries in the Asia-Pacific, IEDs are used in Burma by VEOs, criminals, or civilians retaliating against one another.

Global New Light of Myanmar (9/2/17)

Philippines

On 23 AUG, President Duterte met with chief of the US Pacific Command (USPACOM) to seek a stronger relationship. Discussions revolved around the U.S. support to the Philippine government for the ongoing efforts to end the Marawi conflict, and regional security. Earlier in the week, the U.S. donated a Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS) to the Philippine Navy to boost capability in maritime monitoring amid concerns in the South China Sea, and can also be used to conduct Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response (HADR). **Rappler (8/20/17) ABS-CBN News (8/23/17)**

On 27 AUG, Cayamora Maute, the patriarch of the Maute Group died from an illness while in prison. Government forces are preparing for a greater battle in the event Cayamora's sons, Abdullah and Omar, put blame on the government for his death and take revenge. The Institute for Policy Analysis for Conflict (IPAC) doesn't think his death will have any impact on the Maute Group, operations continued when Cayamora was arrested earlier. His death comes one week after ISIS released a video calling for more Muslims from across Southeast Asia to travel to Marawi to wage jihad. **Channel News Asia (8/29/17) UNTV (8/30/17)**

Thailand

15 AUG marked the second anniversary of the Bangkok Erawan Shrine attack that killed 20 civilians and wounded 130. Yusuf Mieraili (then 27) and Bilal Mohammed (then 31, alias Adem Karadag), both ethnic Uyghur Chinese, were accused of being involved in the bomb attack. They were later arrested and detained at a Thai jail, and are still detained and awaiting trial. **Bangkok Post (8/7/17)**

On 20 AUG, Maroyee Radaeng, an active member and leader of the Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK) in Pattani's Yarang district, was arrested for his involvement in the 16-17 AUG VBIED coordinated attack (**see Thailand page**). During his arrest his finger prints and DNA were taken for records. Along with Maroyee four others were arrested; police used biometric capabilities to determine that they had matches for two of the arrestees, linking them to abandoned vehicles found in Pattani's Khok Pho district. Acquiring and maintaining insurgent leaders' DNA and other Biometric information could prove vital in the continued fight in southern Thailand, especially since the names and organizations active in southern Thailand are rarely explicitly identified. **Bangkok Post (8/22/17)**

Indonesia

On 13 AUG, Sulaiman Aman Abdurrahman (alias Oman), a prominent Indonesian ISIS operative and founder of Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), was released from prison in Nusakambangan and promptly re-arrested. Currently being held in at Brimob (Mobile Brigade) Headquarters in Jakarta, he is being investigated for his role in a total of six terror attacks, including the 2016 Jakarta attack. **Channel News Asia (8/17/17) Netral English (8/18/17)**

In addition to temporarily releasing Abdurrahman, Indonesian authorities also released four other inmates: Agus Abdillah, Mohamad Thorik, Sukardi, and Ansar Apriadi. Abdillah was sentenced to seven years for involvement in the Beji bombing. Thorik was serving a seven years for building IEDs in West Java. Sukardi was serving four years for possessing homemade rifles and ammunition. Lastly, Apriadi was serving a six year sentence for his involvement with the Santoso netrok in Posos, Sulawesi. Additionally, Abu Bakar Bashir, prominent cleric and leader of Jamaat Ansharut Tauhid (predecessor of JAD) was temporarily released for three months. Releasing individuals convicted of terror-related offenses (either temporarily or permanently) creates obvious concerns for the spread of militant activity. **Antara News (8/17/17)**


Malaysia

Authorities indicated that recruitment of Malaysians to ISIS has slowed since the death of Muhammad Wandy Mohamad Jedi in April. However, Malaysian authorities are remaining vigilant, and continue to make arrests, including terrorists said to be targeting the 29th Southeast Asia Games in Kuala Lumpur. Once a replacement for Wandy is chosen, such as Zainal (**see POI**), it is possible recruiting figures could begin to increase again. **Benar News (8/22/17)**

Singapore

On 30 AUG, the Ministry of Home Affairs published a news release detailing new laws effective 1 SEP stating that possession of radioactive material or any nuclear explosive devices will face a sentence of mandatory death penalty. On the same day, the United Nations' International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) will also come into effect. **Channel News Asia (8/30/17)**

Philippines: August IED Events



There were seven IED detonation events, three IED found and cleared events, and 12 IED cache events.

On 2 AUG, an IED cache was recovered during a search warrant conducted by the Philippine Army at a residence belonging to the head of the New People's Army's (NPA) Front 51 in barangay Biangan, Makilala, Cotabato, SOCCSKSARGEN, Mindanao Island. The cache contained one 10kg IED, detonating cords, electrical wires, nine-volt battery, three M-16 rifles with 1,500 pieces of ammunition, seven mobile phones, and alleged subversive documents. **Minda News (8/3/17)**

On 10 AUG, an IED detonated by NPA rebels in barangay Sagrada, Bagamanoc, Catanduanes, Bicol island resulted in the injuries of one police officer and two drug suspects. While en route to the hospital, police were ambushed with gunfire by roughly 20 NPA rebels. **Rappler (8/10/17)**


On 17 AUG, two VOIEDs planted by the Maute Group detonated in Marawi City, Lanao del Sur, Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), Mindanao Island. The device detonated as two soldiers stepped on it in a building as they were conducting clearing operations. **GMA News (8/18/17)**

On 20 AUG, an IED cache was recovered by the Regional Special Operations Group from a residence in Arena Blanco, Zamboanga, Zamboanga Peninsula, Mindanao Island. The cache contained 15 sacks of ammonium nitrate (20kg/bag=300kg), 75 blasting caps and a time fuse. Authorities used an asset, who served as poseur-buyer, and successfully bought repacked ammonium nitrate in a plastic bag with four blasting caps and a time fuse. The suspect admitted he was repacking and selling the regulated chemical and bomb components to the local fishermen. **ABS-CBN News (8/20/17)**

On 20 AUG, an IED cache was recovered from fleeing Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) following a firefight with Moro Islamic Freedom Fighters (MILF) in Andavit, Datu Salibo, Maguindanao, ARMM, Mindanao island. The cache contained 11 IEDs which were rigged with blasting devices could be remotely detonated. **Philippine Star (8/21/17)**

This month, IED activity remained consistent from July, half of the events were associated to IED caches belonging to the NPA. Fighting between the MILF and the BIFF began when a faction of the BIFF tried to raise their flag in MILF territory. The MILF are observing a peace treaty while waiting for the government to pass a law to grant self-rule in Muslim areas in Mindanao. If the President does not deliver on this commitment, it could risk the MILF to defect to the BIFF and other pro-IS groups. Important to note, the MILF are cooperating with police in operations against the BIFF.

In Marawi, the siege has been on-going for three months. Troops have been conducting clearing operations, however it is taking longer due to the amount of devices emplaced; over 1,200 IEDs and UXOs have been recovered to date. There are no routes for any of the remaining terrorists to leave or reinforcements to enter the small section of the city they still occupy; ten terrorists were recently intercepted as they tried to enter on boats in Lake Lanao. The AFP has seen progress indicating the end is near, in roughly 2-3 weeks they predict.



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Thailand: August IED Events



There were seven IED detonation events and one IED found and cleared event.

On 1 AUG, a thrown IED detonated at an Army post in Tak Bai, Narathiwat. As two men driving a motorcycle passed by the security post they threw the device in an attempt to create chaos at the post. **The Nation (8/1/17)**

On 4 AUG, an RCIED detonated targeting a police patrol in Sugnai Padi, Narathiwat. The device was detonated by two-way radio as the patrol passed. The device was contained in gas cylinder and was estimated to weigh 20kg. **The Nation (8/4/17)**


On 9 AUG, two IEDs detonated during a complex attack in Chanae, Narathiwat targeting a paramilitary patrol. The first device was contained in a steel box, detonated remotely and weighed an estimated 10kg. The second detonation occurred approximately 100 meters up the road and felled a utility pole. After the second detonation, insurgents attacked the patrol with small arms fire. **Bangkok Post (8/9/17)**

On 16-17 AUG, two VBIEDs detonated and one was found and cleared as part of coordinated VBIED attack. On the morning of 16 AUG, a VBIED was found and cleared and the driver was killed in a small arms fire exchange with authorities in Thepha, Songkhla. On the afternoon of 16 AUG, a VBIED detonated in Nong Chik, Pattani. On 17 AUG, a VBIED detonated at a police barracks in Mayo, Pattani. A total of six pickup trucks were stolen on 16 AUG and used in the coordinated attack across multiple provinces and days. The three remaining vehicles were found without IEDs built into them (see Special Assessment) **Bangkok Post (8/16/17) The Nation (8/16/17) Phuket Gazette (8/17/17) Bangkok Post (8/17/17)**


On 23 AUG, an RCIED detonated against a teacher security unit in Yarang, Pattani. The device was buried roadside and detonated by two-way radio as the security unit passed. The device was contained in a gas cylinder and had an estimated weight of 20kg. **The Nation (8/23/17)**

IED events remained consistent in August, though the theft and rapid manufacture of VBIEDs on 16-17 AUG was unusual. Exploiting a gap in security, insurgents were able to steal six vehicles from a single dealership all at once; in past events, insurgents typically stole one to two vehicles from private citizens. It remains unknown if this change in TTPs will cause a change in the security posture around dealerships or other businesses. In 2014 it was assessed that insurgents had increased their ability to quickly turn a vehicle into a VBIED. While reporting initially indicated that it took upwards of four months to turn a VBIED, insurgents are now able to accomplish the same task in a matter of hours.

Past Year IED Events by Type



Past Year IED Event Casualty Count




IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Burma: August IED Events



Past Year IED Events by Type



There were 14 IED detonation events, two IED found and cleared events, and four IED cache events.

On 1 AUG, an IED prematurely detonated in a house in Pantawpyin, Maungtaw, Rakhine. An IED cache was subsequently recovered. The cache contained two rounds pistol ammunition, two packs of gunpowder, fertilizer, three detonators, one coil of wire, and other items. **GNLM (8/2/17)**

On 25 AUG, an IED detonated after it was thrown towards a police station in Maungtaw, Rakhine. Members of ASRA targeted a local police station with the thrown IED. This was the first event in a series of attacks by ARSA targeting security forces within the Rakhine State (see Incident Highlight). **GNLM (8/25/17) Al Jazeera (8/25/17)**

On 25 AUG, an IED detonated during a complex attack in Maungnamagyi, Maungtaw, Rakhine. ARSA targeted a three-vehicle security forces convoy with the roadside IED attack. This event was part of a series of attacks by ARSA targeting security forces within the Rakhine State. **GNLM (8/27/17)**

On 25 AUG, an IED detonated targeting anti-drug offices and a bridge by ARSA in Phaungtawpyin, Rakhine. The bridge was destroyed in the attack. This event was part of a series of attacks by ARSA targeting security forces within the Rakhine State. **GNLM (8/26/17)**

On 26 AUG, two IEDs were found and cleared on Maungtaw-Buthidaung Road in Myothugyi, Rakhine. The devices were constructed of iron tubes, ammonium nitrate fertilizer, and gun powder; both had wires connected to them leading to a roadside home. This event was part of a series of attacks by ARSA targeting security forces within the Rakhine State. **Al Jazeera (8/25/17)**


On 27 AUG, one IED detonated and three IEDs were found and cleared targeting a police outpost in Ngayantchaung, Rakhine. The IEDs were used when 100 ARSA militants attacked the police outpost. This event was part of a series of attacks by ARSA targeting security forces within the Rakhine State. **GNLM (8/28/17)**

On 29 AUG, an IED cache was recovered by security forces during a raid in Koetankauk, Maungtaw, Rakhine. The cache contained: three IEDs (pipe bombs 12 inches by 4 inches), three RCIEDs, seven rounds of .303 ammunition, three packages of 100-foot long wire, six RC devices, three batteries, food items (with World Food Program and USAID logos), and seven bags of medicines. The cache is suspected to have been owned by the ASRA. **Eleven Myanmar (8/29/17)**


Due to spike of activity by ARSA at the end of August, IED events increased this month. During the large-scale coordinated attack by ARSA against security forces, IEDs were frequently used; though the exact number of individual events is unknown, there may have been as many as 45 total instances of IED use from 25-28 AUG. While reporting on the individual events was incomplete, an overall increase in media reporting (to include device images) allowed for more specific information about IEDs used. The cache recovered in 29 AUG included images of pipe bombs incorporating RC switches. ARSA's operations in Rakhine over the past year have become increasingly hostile and complex, and their IED capabilities may continue to develop away from the relatively crude devices they are currently using to more complex devices, particularly if they begin to receive external aid from other VEOs.

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Indonesia: August IED Events



Past Year IED Events by Type



There was IED cache event and one IED hoax event.

On 15 AUG, police recovered an IED cache following a series of raids at the homes and safe houses of suspected Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) militants in Bandung, West Java. The recovered cache contained an IED with radioactive material extracted from household sources (Thorium-232). Five JAD militants were arrested. **Pressreader (8/16/17) Benar News (8/15/17) Netral News (8/16/17) Netral News (8/16/17) AFP (8/16/17) Reuters (8/25/17)**

On 16 AUG, a hoax IED was recovered in front of the Sumbawa Regent's Office in Sumbawa, West Nusa Tenggara. The device was discovered by a police officer patrolling the area after observing an unidentified suspect dropping a suspicious object near the office's premises. Police described the contents of the hoax device as consisting of a PVC pipe 21cm long with a diameter of 9.5cm (container), 202-5cm nails and 83-7cm nails (enhancements), 205 grams of ammonium nitrate fuel oil (ANFO), alarm clock (switch), detonators, copper wires, an LED light, a 1.5 volt battery, and packing tape. **Netral News (8/16/17) Pula Sumbawa News (8/16/17) Radar Lombok (8/18/17)**

IED events were lower in August than July, however the recovery of the 15 AUG IED with radioactive materials is extremely concerning. Although police originally reported the device as a "chemical bomb," sources from Reuters later clarified that the device involved radioactive materials (Thorium-232) which they extracted from a large supply of a common household items (while the media reporting does not specify what the household item is, it is commonly known gas lantern mantles contain Thorium-232).

According to Reuters' sources, the militants believed they would be able to convert Thorium-232 into Uranium-233 and ultimately use the Uranium-233 to build a nuclear weapon. However, the JAD cell appeared to be guided by bad science and their designs and plans had no hope of succeeding as a nuclear weapon. Thorium-232 can theoretically be transformed into Uranium-233, however it would require irradiation from a powerful source, such as a nuclear reactor, much more than the x-ray machine or microwave sources they intended on using. Additionally, the JAD cell believed they could simply combined the Uranium-233 with a high explosive such as TATP to build a nuclear bomb, when in reality it would require a careful arrangement of the explosive charges to achieve an implosion effect in order to create the nuclear explosion.


The JAD cell appeared to be guided by a 47-page Indonesian-language instruction manual named "Nuclear for Dummy," (sic) authored by Bahrun Naim, a known Indonesian ISIS leader living in Syria. Although the militants appeared to have been guided by bad science, it is alarming that JAD militants are even attempting to build such a device. It is also possible that although they fell short of creating a nuclear bomb, and will likely remain very far from possessing the skills or equipment to do so, they might have achieved in building a "dirty bomb" that could have dispersed the radioactive Thorium-232 when the conventional device detonated.

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Malaysia: August IED Events



Past Year IED Events by Type



There was one IED detonation event.

On 13 AUG, an IED detonated at the Rural Transformation Center in Napoh, Jitra, Kedah. Unidentified assailants detonated the IED near an ATM belonging to the Bank Simpanan Nasional. At the scene investigators found traces of Sulphur and a small iron ball, which they believe were part of the IED's composition. According to the police, the bombers were attempting to pry open the ATM with the IED blast, but the device failed to cause enough damage to do so.

Malay Mail Online (8/14/17)

This past month, Malaysia experienced another ATM bombing. Although this is the first reported ATM bombing in over a year, this is a well-established tactic that has been employed in Malaysia numerous times over the past few years (**for more background see the Malaysian page of the May 2016 Monthly**). In response to this common threat, some banks have installed ink bombs into their machines that stain the banknotes should their ATM be tampered with.

Typically, ATM bombers use relatively crude devices. Their devices are usually pipe bombs with time fuses and their main charge is usually black powder which is extracted from common fireworks. The Sulphur residue that was left behind, a black powder precursor, suggests that this most recent event conformed to this established TTP.

Northeast Asia: August Significant Activity

Taiwan

In preparation for the 2017 Summer Universiade, the local aviation police conducted a counter-terrorism drill on 14 AUG. The drill took place at the Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport, and included the dispatch of 14 top performing IED Dogs. The drill is designed to prepare the aviation police SWAT force for possible terrorist attacks and bomb threats for the duration of the Universiade from 19-30 AUG. Both aviation police force and military police special services are prepared to rapidly respond and evacuate the high influx of Universiade airport passengers in case of terroristic activities. **Taiwan News (8/14/17)**

Japan

Under the leadership of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Japan is building up influence in the contested South and East China Seas. One of Abe's strategies is to partner with Asian nations like Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia by aiding these nations to expand their own maritime capabilities. In addition to affirming Japan's ties with other nations in the region, the country has increased drills with the United States military in an impressive show of force in the disputed waters of the South China Sea. The partnerships are underlining Abe's objective of preserving international order and ensuring the rule of law at sea, while defending East Asia vital sea routes against China's growing dominance in the maritime domain. China is undertaking extensive reclamation of the disputed Senkaku Islands, which are currently under Japan's administration, and the country's construction of man-made islands is constricting the already crowded waterways, threatening the free-flow of vital resources in the region. Despite China's dissatisfaction with Japan's growing control in the region, Prime Minister Abe is determined to continue Japanese diplomatic operations in Southeast Asia. **Diplomat (8/28/17)**

IED Calendar

The IED calendar was established to help our audience maintain awareness of events, such as anniversaries of major attacks, or political, religious or cultural events that often coincide (or can potentially coincide) with a spike in IED events.

	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
28 JUL - 3 AUG (IND): Martyr's Weeks 8 AUG 1988 (BUR): 8888 Uprising 14 AUG 1947 (IND): Naga Independence Day 15 AUG 1949 (IND): Independence Day 23 AUG 2003 (IND): Mumbai Attack - Gateway of India 31 AUG 1957 (MAL/THA): Hari Merdeka Malaysian Independence Day/Bersatu Foundation Day (Southern Thailand)	30 IND	31 IND	1 IND	2 IND	3 IND	4	5
	6	7	8 BUR	9	10	11	12
	13	14 IND	15 IND	16	17	18	19
	20	21	22	23 IND	24	25	26
	27	28	29	30	31 MAL THA	1 BUR	2
	August 2017						
1 SEP 2007 (BUR): Anniversary of Saffron Revolution 9 SEP 2004 (INDO): Anniversary of Australian Embassy Bombing 18 SEP (NEP): Phase II local elections 21 SEP-19 OCT (WW): Al-Hijrah Islamic New Year 25 SEP 2002 (IND): Akshardham Temple Attack 1 OCT 2005 (INDO): Bali attack anniversary 24 OCT 2002 (THA): Tak Bai Incident	3	4	5	6	7	8	9 INDO
	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
	17	18 NEP	19	20	21 WW	22 WW	23 WW
	24 WW	25 IND WW	26 WW	27 WW	28 WW	29 WW	30 WW
	September 2017						
1 OCT 2005 (INDO): Bali attack anniversary 24 OCT 2002 (THA): Tak Bai Incident	1 INDO WW	2 WW	3 WW	4 WW	5 WW	6 WW	7 WW
	8 WW	9 WW	10 WW	11 WW	12 WW	13 WW	14 WW
	15 WW	16 WW	17 WW	18 WW	19 WW	20	21
	22	23	24 THA	25	26	27	28
	29	30	31	1	2	3	4
	October 2017						

IND – India
 NEP – Nepal
 BUR – Burma
 MAL – Malaysia
 INDO – Indonesia
 THA – Thailand
 WW – Worldwide

Common Terms and Acronyms

AN – Ammonium Nitrate
 ANFO – Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil
 ARMM – Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
 CIV – Civilian
 CBRN – Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
 COIN – Counter-insurgency
 CWIED – Command Wire IED
 DTMF – Dual-Tone Multi-Frequency
 EFP – Explosively Formed Projectile
 EOD – Explosive Ordnance Disposal
 F/C – Found & Cleared
 HME – Homemade Explosives
 HN – Host Nation (Police, Military, Government)
 IDF – Indirect Fire
 IDP – Internally Displaced Persons
 IED – Improvised Explosive Device
 KFR – Kidnap for Ransom
 KIA – Killed in Action
 LOC – Line of Communication
 LPG – Liquefied Petroleum Gas
 MSR – Main Supply Routes
 NFI – No Further Information
 NSTR – Nothing Significant To Report
 PBA – Post Blast Analysis

PBIED – Personnel Borne (Suicide Bomb) IED
 PCB – Printed Circuit Board
 PN – Partner Nation
 PPIED – Pressure Plate IED
 QRF – Quick Response Force
 RCIED – Radio Controlled IED
 RCP – Route Clearance Patrols
 RPG – Rocket Propelled Grenade
 SA – South Asia
 SAF – Small Arms Fire
 SEA – Southeast Asia
 SVBIED – Suicide Vehicle Borne IED
 TATP – Triacetone Triperoxide
 TNT – Trinitrotoluene (C₇H₅N₃O₆)
 TTP – Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
 UXO – Unexploded Ordnance
 VBIED – Vehicle Borne IED
 VEO – Violent Extremist Organization
 VOIED – Victim Operated IED
 WIA – Wounded in Action

Governments, Groups and Organizations

ASG – Abu Sayyaf Group
 BIFF – Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters
 BIPP – Barisan Islam Perberbasan Patani
 BRN-C – Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate
 BSF – Border Security Forces
 BNP – Bangladesh National Party
 BriMob – Mobile Brigade (Indonesia CT Forces)
 CPI-M – Communist Party of India (Maoist)
 CPN-M – Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
 CPP – Communist Party of the Philippines
 CRPF – Central Reserve Police Force (India)
 GMIP – Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Patani
 HM – Hizb-ul-Mujahideen
 HNLC – Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (India)
 HUJI-B – Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami Bangladesh
 IB – India's Intelligence Bureau
 IM – Indian Mujahideen
 IrW – Irregular Warfare
 ISI – Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan)
 ISIS – Islamic State of Iraq ash Sham
 JAT – Jemaah Ansharout Tauhid
 JI – Jemaah Islamiya
 JTMM – Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha
 JIB – Jemaat-e-Islami Bangladesh

JeM – Jaish-e-Mohammed
 JMB – Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh
 JMJB – Jama'atul Muslim Janta Bangladesh
 KIA – Kachin Independence Army
 KIM – Khalifa Islamiya Mindanao
 KIO – Kachin Independence Organization
 LeT – Lashkar-e Tayyiba
 MILF – Moro Islamic Liberation Front
 MILF-SOG – MILF-Special Operations Group
 MNLF – Moro National Liberation Front
 NPA – New People's Army
 PNP – Philippine National Police
 POLRI – Indonesian National Police
 PULO – Patani United Liberation Organization
 RAB – Rapid Action Battalion (Bangladesh)
 RKK – Runda Kumpulan Kecil
 SJMM – Samyukta Jatiya Mukti Morcha
 SJTMM – Samyukta Jana Tantrik Terai Mukti Morcha
 ULFA – United Liberation Front of Assam
 UWSA – United Wa State Army
 YCL – Youth Communist League